RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN TURKEY – ABDUL WAHAB
Concerning many, diversely most problems, there are multiple conflicting views between individuals who appear to be equally knowledgeable and truthful. Human beings who obviously have access to the right data and are extremely interested in the truth assert conflicting perspectives on, for example, important economic, social, and political concerns.
The religious diversity of this kind can be researched in many ways — for example, from a psychological, anthropological, or historical context. The current discussion will be concerned primarily with the key issues surrounding religious diversity, with which philosophers, especially analytical thinkers of religion, are most concerned at present.
TURKEY, LAND OF HUMAN HABITATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
The land that is known as Turkey is one of the premature areas of human occupancy and evolution. This evolution makes Turkey a land of different civilizations or different religions. Many countries are comprised of Muslims, but the government of Turkey is secular. The Republic of Turkey was signed in 1913 and began with a constitution. Turkey is a country where people are free to practice their religion, whichever they want to choose.
Turkey is a country of multicultural beliefs. However, its religious diversity is neither recognized nor praised. Instead, the government is represented as culturally homogenous, with 99.8% of the Islamic population, a percentage that is more motivated by the compulsory note (“Islam”) in government-issued identification documents and the cultural effort to quash diversity than by the true status-quo of religious views in the state.
WHO WERE ALVIES:
Alevi is a particular religion in Turkey, not to be baffled with Alewit in Syria. They are followers of Ali, the brother-in-law of Prophet Muhammad.
It is a religion based on universalist ideals of peace and acceptance expressed in mystical poetry, rather than strict rules, passed on through ancient language. Alevis have been oppressed against and imprisoned in Turkey based on degrading abuse claims that Alevi’s rituals include incestual erotic sex parties.
HUNT OF EQUALITY:
Given the incredible disparities in religious practices between the two different groups, the Turkish government has failed to acknowledge Alevi cem evi as a genuine worship place and offer the same economic help and alleviation as the mosques. Instead, Turkey claims that cem evi is an interaction with nature as if the government were to make any such decisions about religion, particularly the faith that the governing party does not represent — currently not a single politician of the parliament. As the Turkish economy tries its efforts to assimilate, Mr. Erdogan’s objective for Turkey stays his self-proclaimed one religious ideology, one holy place.
However, Alevis has seen worse moments in Turkey. They were marginalized and hassled and confined to assaults and murders, such as during the killings in Sivas, Çorum, Maraş, and Dersim. Erdogan’s opening to Alevi, no matter how short-lived this was, at least guaranteed that Alevi’s reliability could no longer be rejected in Turkey. Consequently, Alevis can now claim rights that they have not previously been able to.
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY:
The AK (Justice and Development) Party, which came to power in the 2002 democratic election and keeps going to rule the nation at the current moment, has beliefs functionaries and play a vital outlook on the state’s unstable connection with religious faith. However, even though neither the AK group nor its leader, R. Tayyib Erdoğan, categorically opposed to secularism, has selected to rethink its meaning (Uysal 2013).
“In the 2000s, when secure economic growth picked up steam in reaction to democratic needs, the government started several policy changes needed to restore the rights of both the Muslim majority and the minorities. Most substantial among these was the supply by the Muslim majority to have religious schools and the freedom to use religious symbols in community places”.
The current religious and spiritual activities are mainly high-and middle-income groups; however, college students who are representatives of lower-income groups may also enlist.
Definitely, in the coming years, this will proceed to be one of the previous debates throughout the religious realm in Turkey. Besides, another issue will be the major role of the President of Religious Affairs in the collaboration of faith groups.
Turkey has adopted secularism as a legal provision, but it is also a state in which most people define themselves as religious in one way other and. Motivated and increasing secularism in Turkey’s religion can be explained by a spiritual market model. In particular, field-based empirical studies may help understand the formed faith organizations and groups that proceed to form in Turkey. It is the state of flexible religious practicing and has the freedom of worshipping any religion.
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